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ABSTRACT
The increasing complexity of information technology, attacks on confidential
information, and the passing of new laws and regulations have shifted the focus
around internal controls in organizations. Particularly, general information
technology controls related to change management (i.e., system change controls)
are critical in ensuring the integrity, completeness, and reliability of financial
information. The literature points to various evaluation methods for these controls
to determine which ones to implement. However, these methods do not necessarily
consider relevant organization constraints, preventing the inclusion of required
controls or the exclusion of unnecessary controls. This paper proposes a novel
approach, using Desirability Functions, for evaluating system change controls
providing management with a measurement that is representative of the overall
quality of each control based solely on organizational goals and objectives.
Through a case assessment, the approach is proven successful in providing a way
for measuring the quality of system change controls in organizations.
Keywords: Internal controls, General IT Controls, change management, system
change controls, desirability functions
INTRODUCTION
The increasing complexity of information technology (IT), attacks on confidential
information, and the passing of new laws and regulations have all shifted the focus
around internal controls in organizations. Today, more than ever, organizations

require internal controls to be well-designed, implemented, and to operate
effectively and in compliance with laws and regulations (Lavion, 2018). Internal
controls refer to procedures and activities implemented by management to mitigate
the risks that could prevent a company from achieving its business objectives
(Deloitte, 2018; GTAG 8, 2019).
Business goals and objectives, such as, reliability of the entity’s financial
reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and compliance with
applicable laws and regulations are common objectives that are constantly
threatened in an organization (Otero, 2018; Otero, Ejnioui, Otero, & Tejay, 2011).
Internal controls should be in place and monitored to ensure the goals and
objectives above are met and that any potential concerns regarding the entity’s
going concern are reduced or eliminated.
Internal controls related to IT or General IT Controls (GITC) aid in the protection
of business operations, particularly, by securing the integrity, completeness, and
reliability of financial information, as well as of any other system functionality
underlying business processes (Deloitte, 2018; Otero, 2015a). GITC are policies
and procedures that support the effective functioning of applications, including the
operation of automated controls embedded in the applications, the integrity of
reports generated from the applications, and the security of data housed within the
applications. Based on Deloitte (2018) and Cooke (2019), effective design,
implementation, and operation of GITC are critical and of utmost importance to
major company’s stakeholders (e.g., owners, investors, regulators, audit
committees, management, auditors, etc.) for the following reasons:
•
•
•
•

Business processes, controls, and financial data relevant to financial
information are often relied upon by stakeholders in order to manage the
business and make strategic decisions.
Effective operations of controls around the company’s IT environment
ensure adequate processing and reporting of financial data, as well as
compliance with relevant laws and regulations.
Automation of business processes and financial transactions is becoming
increasingly important and relied upon. Automated controls rely on GITC
to ensure they function properly.
Cyber security is a broad business risk which extends to financial
information.

Inefficiencies or ineffective GITC (deficiencies) may prevent a company from
generating complete and accurate financial reports (Masli, Richardson, Watson, &
Zmud, 2016; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007). Deficiencies in GITC, if not timely

identified and addressed, may also impact the overall functioning of internal
controls, result in delayed financial closing process, increase audit costs, and impact
internal decisions and/or public disclosure, ultimately affecting the reputation and
brand of the company.
GITC commonly include controls over (1) data center and network operations
(also referred to as information systems operations); (2) information or access
security; and (3) change management. Change management includes controls
around the areas of system software acquisition, change and maintenance, program
change, and application system acquisition, development and maintenance. These
change management controls altogether may collectively be referred to as system
change controls or SCC.
SCC are critical in ensuring the security, integrity, completeness, and reliability
of financial information (Keef, 2019; Otero, 2015a; GTAG 2, 2019; Otero, Tejay,
Otero, & Ruiz, 2012; Ejnioui, Otero, Tejay, Otero, & Qureshi, 2012). SCC include
controls over each of the relevant technology elements within the entity’s IT
environment, including the application system, database, operating system and
network. Examples of SCC include change request approvals; application and
database upgrades; and network infrastructure monitoring and security; among
others. Given the significance and rapid integration of IT systems with business
processes, SCC must be in place in order to maintain the completeness and accuracy
of information, as well as the reliability of business processes within the
organization.
Change Management Process and Challenges
As stated before, change management is one of the three major GITC areas that
assess organization’s policies and procedures related to application systems in order
to support the effective functioning of application controls (Otero, 2018).
According to the Information Technology Infrastructure Library Change
Management (2016), change management is a process designed to understand and
minimize risks while making changes within the IT environment. The objective of
change management is to enable the IT environment to allow rapid change while
minimizing the possibility of disruption. The decision about whether to approve
and implement a proposed IT change is sometimes a strategic one, and therefore it
is expected that the change management process be adequately managed and
controlled.
Changes in the IT environment, including systems and applications, can result
from a new law or regulation requirement, or from an update needed to enhance the

current system’s functionality (Masli et al., 2016). In both cases, before
implementation in the live or production environment, changes must be evaluated,
documented, approved, developed, and tested in an adequate and controlled manner
(Hornstein, 2015; Mitra & Mishra, 2016). However, there are always several
challenges when carrying out this process.
For instance, implementation of changes directly into an application system may
override already existing automated application controls for particular financial
transactions or certain set of transactions, leading to serious data accuracy and
integrity issues. An example would be the direct implementation of a change that
affects the system’s calculation of depreciation for recorded fixed assets. The direct
change may had not been adequately tested or evaluated, resulting in an inaccurate
posting of depreciation. Moreover, if this change is implemented by year end, it
may lead to incorrect representation of financial information. Another example
would be the direct implementation of emergency changes. According to Pillai,
Pundir, and Ganapathy (2014), an emergency change is any change, major or
minor, that must be made quickly as an immediate fix, without following standard
change management procedures (e.g., appropriate documentation, rigorous testing,
etc.) prior to implementation in production. Management must approve such
changes before they are undertaken or implemented. These types of direct changes
are typically not documented or tested prior to their implementation, leading to an
adverse impact which would be difficult to roll-back and trail.
Another challenge in the change management process involves the
implementation of unauthorized changes which may harm the production
environment, causing severe data integrity issues. Unauthorized changes may lead
to incomplete implementations, leaving out critical functionality. Unauthorized
changes may also result in the processing of incorrect financial data, ultimately
opening up opportunities for fraud (Lavion, 2018). Proper authorization of changes
prior to their development and implementation will bring all relevant stakeholders
on board and ensure that the intended change is aligned and consistent with business
goals, objectives, and/or requirements.
A third challenge relates to inadequate segregation of duties. A well-controlled
change management process monitors and ensures that there is proper segregation
between who initiates the change, who approves the change, who develops the
change, and who implements the change in the production environment. Having the
same individual with granted access to analyze, design, construct, test, and
implement a change in the live environment may result in overlooking errors,
implementing incorrect and incomplete changes, etc. Per Otero (2019a) and Otero
(2014), individuals with complete access to develop and implement changes into

production will trigger many dangerous systems’ risks, including but not limited
to: unauthorized access to programs or data; unauthorized remote access; inaccurate
information; erroneous or falsified data input; incomplete, duplicate, and untimely
processing; communications system failure; inaccurate or incomplete output; and
insufficient documentation. Segregation of duties certainly plays an important role
in the entire change management process and must be effectively controlled.
Current IT Environment
Throughout the years, organizations have experienced numerous system losses
which have had a direct impact on their most valuable asset, information. Schwartz
(1990) stated that losses related to confidential, sensitive, and/or financial
information will continue to happen, and their effect will be devastated to
organizations. Examples of information losses suffered by organizations result
from fraud and economic crimes (i.e., white-collar crime), from altering and/or
acquiring unauthorized access, from injecting malicious code, and from the
inappropriate implementation of changes, all of which could result in inaccurate
calculations, unreliable processing, incomplete recording of data, lost data, cutoff
errors, and other misstatements of the accounting records (ISACA, 2011; Otero,
Sonnenberg, & Bean, 2019; Otero, 2019b).
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) (2019), white-collar
crime or corporate fraud continues to be one of the FBI’s highest criminal priorities.
Corporate fraud results in significant financial losses to companies and investors
and continue causing immeasurable damage to the U.S. economy and investor
confidence. FBI (2019) states that the majority of corporate fraud cases pursued
mostly involve accounting schemes, such as: false accounting entries and/or
misrepresentations of financial condition; fraudulent trades designed to inflate
profits or hide losses; and/or illicit transactions designed to evade regulatory
oversight. The above schemes are designed to deceive investors, auditors, and
analysts about the true financial condition of a corporation or business entity (Otero,
2015b). These schemes are often the result of weakly-implemented controls,
particularly SCC (Keef, 2019; Otero, 2015a). SCC include controls over relevant
technology elements such as financial application systems, databases, operating
systems, and networks. Therefore, they must be in place to maintain complete and
accurate financial information, as well as to safeguard against any potential
manipulation or abuse of such relevant information.
Through manipulation of financial data, share price, or other valuation
measurements, financial performance of a corporation may remain artificially
inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public.

To add to the above, in a Global Economic Crime Survey performed by
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2014), the views of more than 5,000 participants
from over 100 countries were featured on the prevalence and direction of economic
crime since 2011. The survey revealed that 54% of U.S. participants reported their
companies experienced fraud or inconsistencies with their financial systems in
excess of $100,000 with 8% reporting fraud in excess of $5 million. Moreover, the
use of web applications (which has grown exponentially and benefitted many
organizations) has also brought in security risks and vulnerabilities around financial
information creating significant exposure for many organizations (ISACA, 2011;
Thomé, Shar, Bianculli, & Briand, 2018). The alarming facts and figures above all
point to an inadequacy in today's IT environment and serve as motivation for
finding new ways to help organizations improve their capabilities for securing,
managing, and controlling valuable information.
Currently, most of the challenges related to change management practices are
addressed through the use of tools and technologies (Singh, Picot, Kranz, Gupta, &
Ojha, 2013; Volonino & Robinson, 2004; Vaast, 2007). However, it is argued that
these tools and technologies alone are not sufficient to address the change
management-related problems just presented (Keef, 2019; Herath & Rao, 2009).
To improve overall change management practices, organizations must evaluate
(and thus implement) appropriate SCC that satisfy their specific security
requirements (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Karyda,
Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis, 2004). However, due to a variety of organizationalspecific constraints (e.g., cost, scheduling, resources availability, etc.),
organizations do not have the luxury of selecting and implementing all required
SCC. Therefore, the selection and implementation of SCC within organizations'
business constraints become a non-trivial task.
This research proposes a novel approach for evaluating the most appropriate SCC
based on organization specific criteria. The proposed approach uses Desirability
Functions to quantify the desirability of each SCC taking into account benefits and
penalties (restrictions) associated with implementing the SCC. This provides
management with a measurement that is representative of the overall quality of each
SCC based on organizational goals and objectives. The derived quality
measurement can be used as the main metric for selecting SCC.
BACKGROUND WORK
Various reasons have been put forth for explaining the lack of effectiveness in the
evaluation, selection, and implementation process of internal controls. Wood
(2000) argues that the implementation of controls in organizations may constitute

a barrier to progress. For instance, participants from the ICIS 1993 conference panel
indicated that the implementation of controls may slow down production thereby
turning the employees’ work ineffective (Loch, Conger, & Oz, 1998). Employees
may view controls as interrupting their day-to-day tasks (Post & Kagan, 2007) and
may, therefore, tend to ignore implementing them in order to be effective and
efficient with their daily job tasks.
According to Saint-Germain (2005), organizations are required to identify and
implement appropriate controls to ensure adequate information security.
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) place emphasis on the fact that “different
organizations have different security needs, and thus different security
requirements and objectives” (p. 344). Whitman, Towsend, and Aalberts (2001)
also stress that there is no single information security solution that can fit all
organizations. As a result, controls must be carefully selected to fit the specific
needs of the organization. Identification and implementation of the most effective
controls is a major step towards providing an adequate IT environment in
organizations (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000).
Previous Approaches in the Selection and Evaluation of SCC in Organizations
Based on Barnard and Von Solms (2000), the process of identifying (and
selecting) the most effective SCC in organizations has been a challenge in the past,
and plenty of attempts have been made to come up with the most effective way
possible. Risk analysis and management (RAM) is just one example. RAM has
been recognized in the literature as an effective approach to identify SCC (Barnard
& Von Solms, 2000). RAM consists of performing business analyses as well as risk
assessments, resulting in the identification of information security requirements
(Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). RAM would then list the information security
requirements as well as the proposed SCC to be implemented to mitigate the risks
resulting from the analyses and assessments performed.
RAM, however, has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (Van der
Haar & Von Solms, 2003), not taking into account organizations’ specific
constraints. For example, through performing RAM, organizations may identify 50
change management-related risks. Nonetheless, management may not be able to
select and implement all necessary SCC to address the previously identified 50 risks
due to costs and scheduling constraints. Moreover, there may not be enough
resources within the organization to implement these SCC. In this case,
management should list all those risks identified and determine how critical each
individual risk is to the organization, while considering costs versus benefits

analyses. Management must, therefore, explore new ways to determine and
measure the relevancy of these SCC considering the constraints just presented.
Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks is another approach widely used by
organizations to introduce minimum controls in organizations (Barnard & Von
Solms, 2000). Saint-Germain (2005) states that best practice frameworks assist
organizations in identifying appropriate SCC. Some best practices include: Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT), Information
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Change Control, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), and Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) have mentioned
other best practice frameworks which have also assisted in the identification and
selection of SCC. These are: International Standardization Organization (ISO) /
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 27001 and 27002 and the
Capability Maturity Model, among others.
The process of selecting the most effective set of SCC from these best practice
frameworks can be challenging (Van der Haar & Von Solms, 2003). Van der Haar
and Von Solms (2003) state that best practice frameworks leave the choosing of
controls to the user, while offering little guidance in terms of determining the best
controls to provide adequate protection for the particular business situation.
Additionally, frameworks do not take into consideration organization specific
constraints, such as, costs of implementation, scheduling, and resource constraints.
Other less formal methods used in the past, such as, ad hoc or random approaches,
could lead to the inclusion of unnecessary controls and/or exclusion of
required/necessary controls (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). Identifying and
selecting SCC based on the above may result in organizations not being able to
protect the overall confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information
(Saint-Germain, 2005). In order to increase the effectiveness of the selection and
prioritization process for SCC, new methods need to be developed that save time
while considering major factors (e.g., constraints, restrictions, etc.) that
undoubtedly affect the selection of SCC.
In another study, Gerber and Von Solms (2008) created a Legal Requirements
Determination Model (LRDM) for defining legal requirements, which in turn,
indicated relevant SCC to be selected from a list provided in the ISO/IEC 27002
best practice framework to satisfy the identified legal requirements. Specifically,
the authors: (1) developed a structured model to assist in establishing information
security requirements from a legal perspective; (2) provided an interpretation of the
legal source associated with information security requirements; and (3) proposed
potential SCC from the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework to address the

already identified legal information security requirements. Legal information
security requirements were determined by devising and utilizing a legal compliance
questionnaire in combination with a legal matrix that included mappings of legal
aspects within each of the proposed legal categories to all related ISO/IEC 27002
controls. Following determination of the legal requirements, a list of relevant SCC
from the ISO/IEC 27002 framework was produced to satisfy the previously
identified legal requirements.
Nonetheless, as evidenced earlier, the selection of SCC from baseline manuals or
best practice frameworks, as it is the case with the LRDM using the ISO/IEC 27002
framework, represents a weakness. Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks
offer little guidance in terms of determining the best controls to provide adequate
security for the particular business situation (Van der Haar & Von Solms, 2003).
Furthermore, baseline manuals or frameworks do not necessarily take into
consideration organization specific constraints, such as costs, scheduling, and
resource constraints, among others.
SOLUTION APPROACH
To properly evaluate the quality, significance, and priority of SCC in
organizations, management must follow a methodology that takes into
consideration the quality attributes of the SCC that are considered relevant. The
methodology must provide capabilities to determine the relative importance of each
identified quality attribute. This would allow the methodology to provide an SCC
selection/prioritization scheme that represents how well these SCC meet quality
attributes and how important those quality attributes are for the specific
organization. To achieve this, the methodology created in Otero, Otero, and
Qureshi (2010) is modified and customized to solve the problem of prioritizing
SCC in organizations. First, a set of quality attributes are identified as evaluation
criteria for all possible SCC. These attributes are defined in terms of different
features, where each feature is determined to be either present or not. Once all
features are identified, each individual SCC is evaluated against each feature using
a simple binary (boolean) scale (i.e., 0 or 1). SCC that satisfy the highest number
of features would expose a higher level of quality (or priority) for that particular
quality attribute. Once all SCC are evaluated and measurements computed for all
features, the proposed approach uses Desirability Functions to fuse all
measurements into one unified value that is representative of the overall quality of
the SCC. This unified value is computed by using a set of Desirability Functions
that take into consideration the priority of each quality attribute. Therefore, the
resulting priority of each SCC is derived based on management goals and
organization needs. This results in an SCC evaluation/prioritization approach based

on how well SCC meet quality attributes and how important those quality attributes
are for the organization.
DESIRABILITY FUNCTIONS
Desirability Functions are a popular approach for simultaneous optimization of
multiple responses (Derringer & Suich, 1980; Montgomery, 2008). They have been
used extensively in the literature for process optimization in industrial settings,
where finding a set of operating conditions that optimize all responses for a
particular system is desired (Otero, Otero, & Qureshi, 2010). Through Desirability
Functions, each system response yi is converted into an individual function di that
varies over the range 0 ≤ di ≤ 1, where di = 1 when a goal is met, and di = 0
otherwise (Montgomery, 2008). Once each response is transformed, the levels of
each factor are typically chosen to maximize the overall desirability which is
represented as the geometric mean of all m transformed responses (Derringer &
Suich, 1980). Alternatively, when factors are uncontrollable, the overall desirability
value can be used to characterize the system based on the multiple selected criteria.
Similar to the characterization of industrial processes, the evaluation of the quality
and prioritization of each SCC in organizations can be approached by finding the
set of criteria that provide the optimal benefit versus cost value for a particular
organization. When formulated this way, Desirability Functions can be used to
provide a unified measurement that characterizes the quality of SCC based on a set
of predefined evaluation criteria. Once the desirability of all SCC is computed,
management can use this information to determine the relative priority of SCC and
select the best ones simply by choosing the most desirable ones for the particular
organization.
Computing Desirability
The first step in the Desirability Functions approach involves identifying all
possible SCC that could be implemented in an organization. These SCC can be
obtained from the best practice frameworks as mentioned earlier. For instance, ITIL
Change Control, COBIT, and/or ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, all offer best practices
or controls to help companies ensure that all program/system changes are
appropriately managed, minimizing the likelihood of disruption, unauthorized
alterations, and errors which may impact the accuracy, completeness, and valid
processing and recording of financial information. Once selected, the results of
these SCC are captured in the SCC vector, as presented in (4.1).

 n1 
n 
X =  2
 
 
n n 

(4.1)

Once the SCC vector is identified, each SCC can be evaluated against a set of
quality attributes QA1, QA2,.., QAn. The evaluation process takes place as follow.
First, each quality attribute is defined in terms of m features, where m > 1. The
evaluation scale for each feature is binary; that is, the feature is evaluated as being
present/true (i.e., 1) or missing/false (i.e., 0). For example, SCC can be prioritized
based on their scope. In other words, SCC that effectively minimize the likelihood
of disruption, unauthorized alterations, and errors impacting the accuracy,
completeness, and validity of processing and recording of financial information in
many systems (i.e., more than one system) have a higher priority than SCC that
address the above in a smaller number of systems. In this case, the quality attribute
scope can be defined with the following features: System 1, System 2, ..., System n.
Therefore, the highest priority SCC (based on the scope quality attribute) would be
one where System 1 = 1, System 2 = 1, and System n = 1. Similarly, the lowest
priority SCC based on the scope quality attribute is one where System 1 = 0, System
2 = 0, and System n = 0. For quality attributes where the presence of features
affects change management practices negatively (e.g., restrictions, penalties, etc.),
the reverse is true. In these cases, SCC with all features present (i.e., 1) result in
lower priority and SCC with all features missing (i.e., 0) will result in higher
priority. With this framework in place, a measurement of the importance of the jth
SCC based on the ith quality attribute (e.g., scope) can be computed using (4.2),
m

y ij =

f
x =0

m

x

(4.2)

where m is the number of features identified for the ith quality attribute. This
computation normalizes the evaluation criteria to a scale of 0 – 100, where 0
represents the lowest score and 100 the highest (backwards for restrictions or
penalties). The overall assessment of the SCC set based on all quality attributes is
captured using the quality assessment matrix Q presented in (4.3). As seen, each yij
value of the matrix represents the score of the jth SCC based on each individual ith
quality attribute. It is important to point out that the quality assessment matrix can
be extended to evaluate SCC based on any quality attributes containing numerous
features.
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Finally, to assess the importance of each quality attribute, a weight vector W is
created where ri represents the importance of the QAi quality attribute using the
scale 0 – 10, where 0 represents lowest importance and 10 represents highest
importance. The weight vector W is presented in (4.4).
 r1 
r 
W = 2

 
rm 

(4.4)

Once the information from X, Q, and W is collected, desirability values for each
SCC can be computed using the desirability matrix d presented in (4.5). As seen,
each dij value of the matrix represents the desirability of the jth SCC based on each
individual iih quality attribute.
 d11
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Each individual desirability value dij for the SCC is computed according to
management based on the organization’s specific needs, goals, and objectives. For
example, quality attributes that are represented positively by a higher yij value are
transformed using the maximization function in (4.6) (Montgomery, 2008).
Alternatively, quality attributes that are represented negatively by a higher yij value
are transformed using the minimization function in (4.7) (Montgomery, 2008),
0


ri
 y ij − L 
d ij = 

 T − L 

1


y ij  L
L  y ij  T
y ij  T

(4.6)

1


 U − y ij
d ij = 
 U − T

0


y ij  T





ri

T  y ij  U

(4.7)

y ij  U

where L and U are the lower and upper limits, respectively, T is the target objective
(e.g., 100 for maximization, 0 for minimization), and ri is the desirability weight
for the ith quality attribute. It is important to note that (4.6) and (4.7) are the normal
equations for the Desirability Function approach. However, through
experimentation, it was found that the approach for SCC selection and prioritization
performed better when dij > 0. Therefore, as heuristic, when dij is less than .0001,
the dij value is set to .0001. A desirability weight of r = 1 results in a linear
Desirability Function; however, when r > 1, curvature is exposed by the
Desirability Function to emphasize on being close to the target objective (T). When
0 < r < 1, being close to the target objective is less important. Once individual
desirability values for each quality attribute are computed, the overall SCC
desirability value can be computed using (4.8). As seen, each overall desirability
value is computed as the geometric mean of all m individual desirability values for
SCC 1, 2, …, n.
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After overall desirability values are computed for all SCC, management can use
these values as a priority measurement derived from the predefined quality
attributes and their relative importance for the particular organization.
CASE ASSESSMENT
This section presents the results of a SCC evaluation/prioritization case
assessment using the proposed approach applied in the context of a fictitious
organization implementing ISO/IEC 27002, an international cybersecurity
management standard. The organizational requirement is to determine the most

effective SCC in order to mitigate risks to financial information. We generated
simulated data for cybersecurity quality attributes and features for the input matrix.
The simulated data represents real-life operational data from an organization’s
cybersecurity program. Overall, the case evaluates any 10 SCC based on the
following identified quality attributes, some of which have been defined within the
ISO/IEC 177995 and 27002 standards (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Nachin,
Tangmanee, & Piromsopa, 2019; ISACA, 2009).
1. Restrictions – There are restrictions that management must take into
account before selecting and implementing SCC. These may include
whether the costs involved in the selection and implementation of the SCC
are high, whether resources are not available, and whether there are
scheduling constraints associated with implementing the SCC. The
presence of any of the above will negatively affect the specific quality
attribute. That is, SCC with all features present will result in a lower
priority; conversely, SCC with all features missing will result in a higher
priority. A high priority scenario will be one where the implementation cost
of the specific SCC is considered adequate and manageable (e.g., within
budget), resources are available to implement the particular SCC, and there
are no restrictions in terms of scheduling the SCC (i.e., the SCC can be
scheduled anytime during the year). Restrictions is defined as: Costs (C),
Availability of Resources (AoR), and Scheduling (T).
2. Scope – This quality attribute assesses the impact of the SCC on the
organization. SCC that effectively minimize the likelihood of disruption,
unauthorized alterations, and errors which impact the accuracy,
completeness, as well as validity and recording of financial information in
many systems have a higher priority than SCC that address the above in a
smaller number of systems. Scope is defined as: System 1 (S1), System 2
(S2), …, System n (Sn).
3. Organization’s Objectives – Refers to the number of business goals and
objectives the SCC satisfies. The higher the number of objectives the SCC
satisfies, the higher the desirability of the SCC. Organization’s objectives is
defined with the following features: Objective 1 (O1), Objective 2 (O2), …,
Objective n (On).
4. Access Controls – Implementation of an SCC for this quality attribute will
promote appropriate levels of change management access controls to ensure
protection of the organization’s systems and applications against
unauthorized activities. Organizations may implement network access
controls (N), operating systems access controls (O), and application
controls (A) based on their specific needs.

5. Human Resources – Implementation of SCC support reductions of
unauthorized access, inadequate change implementations, fraud, or misuse
of computer resources by promoting information security awareness (Aw),
training (Tn), and education of employees (E). Depending on the particular
situation, costs involved, and availability of personnel, organizations may
select which of these to employ.
6. Communications and Operations Management – SCC will ensure the
correct and secure operation of information processing facilities, which
includes addressing for adequate segregation of duties (SoD), change
management (CM), and network security (NS). Organizations may select
SCC to address all of these or just some depending on their particular needs.
7. Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance – SCC will support
security related to the organization’s in-house and/or off-the-shelf systems
or applications (e.g., ensure personnel with authorized access can move
changes into production environments, etc.). The higher the number of
systems or applications addressed by the SCC, the higher the desirability of
the SCC. Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance is defined
as: Systems or Applications 1 (SoA1), Systems or Applications 2 (SoA2),
…, and Systems or Applications n (SoAn).
8. Incident Management – Incident Management ensures that security-related
incidents (e.g., attempts to change/manipulate financial data, etc.) identified
within the organization’s processing of information are communicated in a
timely manner and that corrective action is taken for any exceptions
identified. Incident management may apply to online processing and/or
batch processing. Incident Management is defined as Processing 1 (P1),
Processing 2 (P2), …, and Processing n (Pn).
Using synthetic data for the identified quality attributes, binary input evaluation
(Table 1), and Desirability Functions parameters (Table 2), results were generated
from executing the Desirability Functions and presented in Table 3. As seen in
Table 2, all lower and upper boundaries are set to 0 and 100, respectively. Also, all
quality attributes have been identified as having equal priority. This is
accomplished by setting the weight r = 1 for all quality attributes. Finally, different
target values have been identified for each quality attribute. This means that the
threshold for achieving 100% desirability is customized for each quality attribute.
For example, quality attributes where T = 70 are considered 100% desirable if they
exhibit 70% (or more) of the features that define them.

Table 1. Binary Input Evaluation.
QA1 = Restrictions

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

C
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

AoR
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

T
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1

QA2 = Scope
S1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

S2
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1

Sn
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

QA3 = Organization's
Objectives

QA4 = Access
Controls

O1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

N
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0

O2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0

On
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

O
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

A
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0

Table 1. Binary Input Evaluation. (Cont’d)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

QA5 = Human
Resources

QA6 =
Communications and
Operations
Management

QA7 = Systems
Acquisition, Development,
and Maintenance

QA8 = Incident
Management

Aw
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1

SoD
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1

SoA1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

P1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1

Tn
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0

E
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

CM
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1

NS
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0

SoA2
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1

SoAn
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

P2
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

Pn
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1

Table 2. Desirability Function Parameters.

QA1 = Restrictions

QA2 =
Scope

QA3 = Organization's
Objectives

QA4 = Access
Controls

0
100
50
1

0
100
70
1

0
100
100
1

0
100
60
1

L
U
T
r

Table 2. Desirability Function Parameters. (Cont’d)

QA5 = Human
Resources

QA6 = Communications
and Operations
Management

QA7 = Systems
Acquisition,
Development, and
Maintenance

QA8 = Incident
Management

0
100
70
1

0
100
40
1

0
100
40
1

0
100
40
1

L
U
T
r

Table 3. Desirability Function Results.

QA1 = Restrictions
C
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

AoR
1.0000
1.0000
0.6667
1.0000
0.6667
1.0000
0.6667
0.6667
0.6667
0.6667

T

QA2 = Scope
S1

S2
0.9524
0.4762
0.9524
1.0000
0.9524
0.9524
0.0014
0.9524
0.4762
0.4762

Sn

QA3 = Organization's
Objectives
O1

O2
1.0000
0.6667
0.6667
0.3333
0.3333
1.0000
1.0000
0.6667
0.3333
0.3333

On

QA4 = Access
Controls
N

O
A
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.5556
1.0000
0.5556
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Table 3. Desirability Function Results. (Cont’d)
QA5 =
Human
Resources
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Aw Tn E
0.9524
0.9524
0.9524
0.4762
0.4762
0.0014
0.9524
0.4762
0.4762
0.4762

QA6 =
Communications
and Operations
Management
SoD CM NS
0.8333
0.8333
1.0000
0.8333
0.8333
1.0000
0.8333
0.8333
0.8333
0.0025

QA7 = Systems
Acquisition,
Development, and
Maintenance
SoA1 SoA2 SoAn
1.0000
0.0025
1.0000
1.0000
0.8333
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.8333

QA8 =
Incident
Management
P1

P2 Pn
1.0000
1.0000
0.8333
0.8333
1.0000
1.0000
0.8333
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

Desirability

89.27%
40.60%
42.78%
73.32%
35.94%
44.75%
43.85%
81.58%
33.95%
36.13%

As evidenced, each SCC has been evaluated using the identified features for each
quality attribute. The binary input scale is used to determine the presence of
features. Using the proposed approach, the most desirable SCC (based on Table 3)
is SCC 1 (highest Desirability), followed by SCC 8, SCC 4, and so on. It is
important to notice that the evaluation of SCC using this approach is fully
dependent on the particular scenario at hand. In this case assessment, the results are
based on the parameters configured in Table 2. However, if changed to reflect more
priority on different quality attributes, the results would vary from the ones
presented in Table 3. In addition, different applications of the approach can contain
numerous features, which make it fully customizable for practical applications.
CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The research presented in this paper develops an innovative approach for
evaluating the quality of SCC in organizations based on a multiple quality
evaluation criteria. Specifically, it presents a methodology that uses Desirability
Functions to create a unified measurement that represents how well SCC meet
quality attributes and how important the quality attributes are for the organization.
Through a case assessment, the approach is proven successful in providing a way
for measuring the quality of SCC for specific organizations.
There are several important contributions from this research. First, the approach
is simple and readily available for implementation using a spreadsheet. This can
promote usage in practical scenarios, where highly complex methodologies for
SCC selection are impractical. Second, the approach fuses multiple evaluation

criteria and features to provide a holistic view of the overall SCC quality. Third,
the approach is easily extended to include additional quality attributes not
considered within this research. Finally, the approach provides a mechanism to
evaluate the quality of SCC in various domains. By modifying the parameters of
the Desirability Functions, quality of SCC can be evaluated by considering only the
quality attributes that are necessary for the organization. Overall, the approach
presented in this research proved to be a feasible technique for organizations to
effectively and efficiently evaluate the quality of SCC over their financial
information.
Regarding future research work, criteria factors (targeting other specific
organizations' restrictions, goals, regulations, etc.) can be added to improve the
current investigation. In addition, experts from similar industries or organizations
may be interviewed to identify a more accurate set of evaluation criteria that can
potentially be utilized as guidelines, policies, or procedures for the organization
under evaluation. To extend the research, results from this paper can be examined
and compared to SCC assessment results from other similar organizations. A
further opportunity would utilize a hybrid approach (i.e., Desirability Functions
combined with other traditional methodologies) to assess SCC. A hybrid approach
can certainly strengthen current SCC evaluation processes in organizations.
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